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Abstract: Modern scholarship on Late Antique philosophy seems to be more interested than 
ever before in examining in depth convergences and divergences between Platonism and Early 
Christian thought. Plotinus is a key figure in such an examination. This paper proposes a pre-
liminary study of the Plotinian concept of aptitude, as it emerges throughout the Enneads and 
aims at shedding light to certain aspects of Plotinian metaphysics that bring Plotinus into dia-
logue with the thought of Church fathers by means either of similarities or differences between 
Neoplatonist and Christian thought. It will be argued that the concept of aptitude is crucial as 
it involves the relation between the One and the many, the reality of participation, the relation 
of the cosmos with, and its dependence on, the superior spheres of being, the bestowal of divine 
gifts upon beings, and the possibility of the deification of the human being.
Keywords: Aptitude, Christianity, consubstantiality, creation, deification, emanation, hierarchy, 
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Introduction
The importance of ἐπιτηδειότης in the Late Antique conceptual representation of the 
cosmos has generally been acknowledged by the scholarly world. But the concept has 
not benefited from anything more than a sporadic treatment. This is striking, given 
John Dillon’s bold statement that ‘in the Neoplatonic universe ἐπιτηδειότης (Dillon 
uses the term receptivity) is all’.1 Indeed, the primary sources contain a plethora of ev-
idence on the concept. This evidence shows how well aptitude is integrated into the 
philosophical representation of the cosmos in Late Antiquity. Consequently, one 
* Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, panagiotis.pavlos@ifikk.uio.no
1 Glen R. Morrow and John M. Dillon (eds.), Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 13. The literature seems to present no consensus in render-
ing the term epitēdeiotes. There appear several renditions, such as fitness, capacity, receptivity, suit-
ability, appropriateness, adaptability and aptitude. For reasons that I discuss elsewhere, I find most 
accurate to render ἐπιτηδειότης with aptitude. Furthermore, the concept of aptitude is not singularly 
designated by the term epitēdeiotes. One may be aware of the presence in the sources and the use, as 
a matter of fact, of a group of terms that either express the very notion of aptitude in alternative ways 
or point to notions kin to it. A cluster of concepts that are familially connected with aptitude would 
consist of the following plausibly ordered terms: ἐπιτηδειότης (aptitude), πλησιασμός (rapproche-
ment), ἀναλογία (analogy), δύναμις (capacity), δεκτικότης (receptivity), μέθεξις (participation).
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might expect to find aptitude widely discussed in the relevant secondary studies. 
The reality, however, seems to be quite different. For in contrast to the reputed cen-
trality of the concept, very little has been written on it. The lack of adequate study 
is remarkable, if one considers the central questions of Plotinian Neoplatonic meta-
physics that this intricate concept involves: a) the relation between the One and the 
many; b) the reality of participation; c) the relation of the cosmos with, and its de-
pendence on, the superior spheres of being; d) the bestowal of divine gifts upon be-
ings that are lower in rank; and e) the possibility of the deification of the human be-
ing, initially depicted in Plato’s Theaetetus as ‘homoiōsis theō’ (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).2
In addition to this network of central issues, one should consider a cluster of 
topics that either derive from the above, emerging equally in Neoplatonic meta-
physics and Christian thought, or else are found in distinctively alternative ways in 
the philosophical writings of Church fathers. Such a cluster would contain: a) the 
question of becoming, both in its emanationist and creationist aspect; b) the possi-
bility and the reality of receiving and understanding what lies beyond the given sta-
tus of beings and uniting with it by ‘henōsis’ (ἕνωσις, unification), yet while it is their 
object of erōs (ἔρως, love), this ‘beyond’ itself remains paradoxically totally veiled, 
unknown and unknowable; and c) the reception of grace that allows for deification, 
the latter conceived neither as the end of intellectual inquiry and the final release 
of the soul from the malevolent bondage of the body nor as a fusion with divine es-
sence, but as a graced participation that includes the whole man, as soul-body com-
pound, in the life of divinity manifested in the divine power and activity.
In his classic three-volume work on ancient paideia, Werner Jaeger offers a 
thorough study of the history of Greek philosophical culture and thought from 
its origins to its latest and greatest moments.3 Bishop Athanasios Jevtić, in recon-
structing Jaeger’s account says the following: ‘at a certain point, when Jaeger reach-
es the philosophical state of affairs of 3rd century AD and especially the thought 
of Plotinus, he poses the following question: what happened to all this enormously 
great philosophical stream and impulse that after Plotinus disappeared, suddenly as 
it were’?4 Jevtić notes that Plotinus maintained this stream in its peak. He goes on 
to add that after Plotinus one would search almost in vain to find any great Greek 
thinkers. Jevtić makes an even more challenging claim in saying that ‘the few Greek 
philosophers, such as Iamblichus, Proclus and Damascius are only minor figures’, 
2 Plato, Theaet. 176ab.
3 Werner Jaeger, Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. I, Gilbert Highet (transl.), New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965.
4 Athanasios Jevtić, Ἀπὸ τὴν ἐλευθερία στὴν Ἀγάπη [From freedom to Love], Ευανθία Σαρρή (ed.) 
[in Greek], Athens: Domos, 2012, 151-152. Translation from the Greek original inserted by me.
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and that ‘Greek philosophy ceases to exist by the times of the emperor Justinian 
and the forced suspension of the School of Athens’.5
Despite the fact that this claim regarding the decline of Greek philosophy 
would immediately provoke many scholars who would hastily raise harsh objec-
tions against it, a significant point is made here. Plotinus is acknowledged as the last 
great Greek philosopher. I think that Jevtić’s remark is correct. For Plotinus was 
the thinker who synthetized in a novel and inclusive account the central ideas of 
the Presocratics, of Plato and the earlier Platonists, of Aristotle, of the Stoics and of 
the Peripatetics.6 His thought exercised a great influence on later philosophy. Hil-
ary Armstrong judges that Plotinus ‘did not dominate the thought of his time or 
entirely determine the later development of Platonism’.7 But although Armstrong 
would rightly deny that Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism, since he did not 
found a school, looking at it retrospectively and considering the new scholarly evi-
dence, I think it would not be too strong a statement to grant Plotinus such a title. 
One may concede that even St. Augustine himself – to the extent that he held the 
distinction of double activity in divinity and built further on it – owes a great deal 
of the development of his ideas to the Plotinian account.
To obtain an accurate grasp of Plotinus’ metaphysical account and worldview 
is not an easy task. For it concerns a view of a large world.8 The reader of the Enne-
ads will soon come to understand that Plotinus’ metaphysics, as indeed his entire 
philosophy, is the result of a complicated, often controversial in its parts, yet overall 
coherent, reconstruction of reality from the first principle to the wholeness of be-
ing, which is unprecedented in the history of philosophy. A major difficulty in com-
prehending this reconstruction lies on the fact that, despite its originality, Plotinus’ 
thought is ‘backward-looking’,9 and therefore a combination of approaches would 
be necessary for an as complete as possible approach to his world.10 One of the great 
difficulties with Plotinus’ texts is that they often contain an enormously condensed 
amount of information, reflecting the way he wrote his works. As Porphyry testifies, 
the Enneads were written only after their content was fully conceived in Plotinus’ 
mind.11 If that is the case, one could expect the imprints of such condensation not 
only in the big picture of the Plotinian world but also in its specific parts.
5 Ibid.
6 Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, Plotinus, Oxford: Routledge, 2017, 1.
7 Arthur Hilary Armstrong, “Plotinus”, in: A. H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of 
Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 215.
8 Emilsson, Plotinus, 1.
9 Ibid.
10 For the main methodologies, the available paths that Plotinian scholarship has found suitable 
for entering into Plotinus’ world, see, Emilsson, Plotinus, 2.
11 Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 8, 1-8. I use Armstrong’s translation of the Enneads.
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One of the most central parts of the Plotinian metaphysical account consists, 
without doubt, in the concept of participation. Participation (μέθεξις) has been a 
fundamental concept ever since Plato’s theory of Forms. In the Platonic system it 
illustrates the bond connecting the realm of ideas with the world of sensible beings. 
Certainly, there is much that goes on between Plato’s Parmenides and Plotinus. But 
it is also true that Plotinus takes over the concept of participation and brings it to 
the front of the Neoplatonic stage, enhanced now with a new capability of serving 
the increased complexity that the Plotinian metaphysical hierarchy demonstrates. 
Plotinus’ concept of participation would not have developed efficiently without 
the aid of a concept that should be considered as fundamental to participation. 
This is the concept of aptitude.
The main aim of the paper is to argue for the value of this concept within the 
Plotinian worldview. This value may be better appreciated if one gets not only a 
glimpse of Plotinus’ metaphysics but also an awareness of the impact his thought ex-
ercised to the Christian metaphysical developments where aptitude plays a central 
role as well.12 Thus, prior to enter to the section on epitēdeiotes I address some aspects 
of the interface between Plotinus and Christian thought. Next follows the main dis-
cussion on epitēdeiotes, which is enriched by certain insights into the Plotinian real-
ity of participation. My examination of the concept of aptitude develops in connec-
tion with a significant property of the Plotinian hierarchy, that of consubstantiality.
Plotinus and Christianity
Plotinus’ thought is worth studying. Not only because it offers invaluable in-
terpretations of Plato’s doctrines and new accounts that shape a novel understand-
ing of the cosmos. But also because he has become a constant ‘interlocutor’ with 
many Church fathers whose philosophical developments of Christian doctrine 
were built upon either positive appropriations of Plotinian Neoplatonism or crit-
ical transformations of it. Interestingly, as Dermot Moran rightly notes, ‘Plotinus 
was regarded as sympathetic to Christianity and was translated into Latin by the 
Roman senator and convert to Christianity Marius Victorinus’.13 To broaden this re-
mark so as to include both Western and Eastern Christianity would not be wrong; 
Synesius of Cyrene’s ‘connection between soul’s higher generative sources and its 
12 See also, Panagiotis G. Pavlos, ‘‘Aptitude (Ἐπιτηδειότης) and the Foundations of Participation 
in the Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite’’, Studia Patristica XCVI, Papers Presented at the Sev-
enteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2015, M. Vinzent (ed.), Leuven: 
Peeters, 2017, 377-396.
13 Dermot Moran, “Neoplatonism and Christianity in the West”, in: Pauliina Remes and Svetla 
Slaveva-Griffin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism, London: Routledge, 2014, 512.
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earthly permutations’ infused from Plotinus, is just an example.14 These claims can 
be further supported by the fact that not only philosophers but also patristic schol-
ars engage with the thought of Plotinus in fruitfully addressing issues, such as the 
priority of unity and simplicity to multiplicity and diversity and the endless progress 
of beings in the stability of divine goodness,15 the notion of free will – formulated by 
Plotinus in Ennead VI.8 (Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ Ἑνός,)16 as ‘what is up 
to us’ (τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν)17 – and the relevant question on providence (πρόνοια),18 the much 
favoured by Plotinus, as well as by many Neoplatonists image of the circle,19 the doc-
trine of the Logos and the logoi,20 the doctrine of double activity,21 and its relation to 
the complex mechanism of remaining – procession – conversion (μονή – πρόοδος - 
ἐπιστροφή),22 to mention but a few.23
Much could be said about the presence of Plotinus in the works of St. Greg-
ory of Nyssa; the latter had thoroughly read the former.24 Igor Pochoshajew consid-
ers the Plotinian spiritual heritage interwoven with the question of the importance 
of Platonism as a whole in Gregory’s thought.25 St. Gregory, however, unlike Euse-
14 Dimitar Dimitrov, “Neoplatonism and Christianity in the East: philosophical and theolog-
ical challenges for bishops”, in: P. Remes and Sv. Slaveva-Griffin, Handbook of Neoplatonism, 527.
15 Pascal Mueller-Jourdan, “The Foundation of Origenist Metaphysics”, in: Pauline Allen and 
Bronwen Neil (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015, 153-155.
16 Plotinus, Enn. VI.8.1, 17-18; (On Free Will and the Will of the One).
17 See also, Raymond J. Laird, “Mindset (γνώμη) in John Chrysostom”, in: P. Allen and Br. Neil, 
Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, 201.
18 Bronwen Neil, “Divine Providence and the Gnomic Will before Maximus”, in: P. Allen and Br. 
Neil, Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, 236.
19 Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, “Christocentric Cosmology”, in: P. Allen and Br. Neil, Handbook 
of Maximus the Confessor, 310-311.
20 John M. Rist, Plotinus. The Road to Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 
84-102, and Tollefsen, Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, 312-314.
21 Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Remarks on the Relation between the One and Intellect in Ploti-
nus”, in: J.J. Cleary (ed.), Traditions of Platonism. Essays in Honour of John Dillon, Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 1999, 271-290, and Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and 
Early Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 25-27.
22 Tollefsen, Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, 314-315.
23 There is much left out of here. Indicatively, one may also check, Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical 
Theology of the Eastern Church, Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1957, 46-49, Vladimir 
Lossky, The Vision of God, Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1973, 121-123, Placid Spear-
ritt, A Philosophical Inquiry into Dionysian Mysticism, Fribourg: University of Fribourg, 1968, 53, 
Anthony Meredith, “Gregory of Nyssa”, in: Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge History of Phi-
losophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [2010i], 477-480, 
Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, 64-66 and 107-110, and Emilsson, Plotinus, 37-69.
24 Pierre Maraval, “Biography of Gregory of Nyssa”, in: Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio 
Maspero (eds.), The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, VCS, 99, Leiden: Brill, 2010, 104.
25 Igor Pochoshajew, “Plotinus”, in: L.Fr. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Gregory of Nyssa, 629.
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bius of Caesarea, neither refers on any occasion to Plotinus by name, nor does he 
quote him verbatim.26 Anthony Meredith shows that, St. Gregory of Nyssa’s exeget-
ical method in commenting on the presence of God that Moses had experienced on 
Mount Sinai was probably influenced by a passage from Ennead VI.9 (Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ 
ἢ τοῦ Ἑνός),27 a treatise distinguished for its famous conclusive phrase. In chapter 4, 
Plotinus confesses that the great many aporiai humans experience in seeking to in-
terpret their experiences of the One derive from the fact that ‘our awareness of that 
One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as it hap-
pens with other intelligible beings, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge’ 
(Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μηδὲ κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην ἡ σύνεσις ἐκείνου μηδὲ κατὰ 
νόησιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα).28
This passage is important. For here Plotinus points to the experience of a pres-
ence that transcends knowledge and thinking. As such, one may rightly assume that 
what is implied here is the reality of Plotinian ekstasis (ἔκστασις, being out of one-
self ),29 which emerges from the absolute transcendence of the One, perfectly illus-
trated in the passage.30 But it remains questionable whether Plotinus’ idea of deifi-
cation illustrated with ekstasis could be accepted by, and considered in accordance 
with, the notion of deification of Christian thinkers that depends on the under-
standing of God as person (πρόσωπον).31 As Lucian Turcescu notes, prosōpon is a very 
sophisticated concept developed by Gregory of Nyssa in his attempt to clarify the 
paradox of the Holy Trinity; that is, how a single God, whom presumably Plotinus 
acknowledges as the One, comprises three distinct Persons.32 It is impossible to enter 
here into such a subject. However, the reader should be aware of the high relevance 
of the discussion of St. Gregory to the Plotinian vertical hypostatic setting. One may 
think that had Plotinus not developed his influential account of the three hyposta-
ses the way he did it, fourth-century Church fathers would, perhaps, have not need-
ed to clarify such key terms as substance (οὐσία) and person (πρόσωπον, ὑπόστασις).33
Moreover, Vladimir Lossky tells us how much efforts St. Gregory of Na-
26 Anthony Meredith “Neoplatonism”, in: L.Fr. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Gregory of Nyssa, 531.
27 Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 477, especially his discussion on Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus 
on Evil: 480-41, and Alden A. Mosshammer, “Evil”, in: L.Fr. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Gregory 
of Nyssa, 325-330.
28 Plotinus, Enn. VI.9.4, 1-4; (On the Good or the One).
29 Plotinus, Enn. VI.9.11, 22-25.
30 Jens Halfwassen, “The Metaphysics of the One”, in: P. Remes and Sv. Slaveva-Griffin, Hand-
book of Neoplatonism, 191.
31 Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Thought, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, 313 and 318-319.
32 Lucian Turcescu, “Person”, in: L.Fr. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Gregory of Nyssa, 591.
33 Ibid.
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zianzus made to ‘win the philosophers to the contemplation of the Trinity’.34 The 
practice St. Gregory of Nazianzus followed, which was only common to all great 
Christian thinkers, is responsible for the great similarity of conceptual occurrenc-
es common in Church fathers and in Plotinus. One example of such an occurrence 
is the notion of consubstantiality (ὁμοουσιότης).35 I shall return to this issue later on.
There are certain aspects of the Neoplatonist reconstruction of the world that 
are fundamental and they locate in the forestage of the Neoplatonic metaphysi-
cal drama. These are, a) the central notions of the three hypostases systematized 
by Plotinus, the One – Intellect – Soul (Ἕν - Νοῦς - Ψυχή), b) the triadic circular 
scheme of rest (abide) – procession – conversion (μονή - πρόοδος - ἐπιστροφή), which 
in fact derives from the understanding of the hypostases and fills in, so to say, the 
space in between them,36 and c) the doctrine of double activity (ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας 
- ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας), which depicts the fundamental functional mechanism of 
every hypostasis, in other words illustrates the ‘mode of being’ of a hypostasis. As I 
have already mentioned, central to this conceptual representation of the cosmos is 
the concept of participation, already developed by Plato, which is now brought to 
the fore by Plotinus, enhanced with an increased performance and adapted to serv-
ing the complexity that his metaphysical hierarchy demonstrates. Much to this in-
creased performance is due to the Plotinian elaboration of the concept of aptitude.
Aptitude
In general, the term epitēdeiotes designates a capacity or suitability for something.37 It 
refers to the capacity a being possesses for performing an action, whether this action 
is innate to that being, and therefore should be understood as change, or it has an 
external effect or product. By the term ‘being’ one may understand both living and 
lifeless entities. To draw two examples from the experience of daily life and from nat-
ural reality respectively, a carpenter has a specific capacity that allows for wooden ar-
tifacts. Such a person possesses an aptitude for elaborating wooden materials in ways 
profitable to daily life or for esthetic purposes. At the same time, human beings in 
34 Lossky, Mystical Theology, 46. Lossky draws extensively on Plotinus, in his endeavor of sim-
ilarities and differencies between Neoplatonism and Christian thought; see also, Lossky, Vision of 
God, 121-123.
35 Lossky, Mystical Theology, 49. 
36 Certainly, there are restrictions in applying this triad to the first hypostasis, the One.
37 The following linguistic remarks on epitēdeiotes may be useful to the reader. Chantraine (Pierre 
Chantraine, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque. Histoire des Mots, Paris: Éditions 
Klincksieck, 1968) presents epitēdeiotes as a derivative of the words epitēdeios (ἐπιτήδειος, apt for, made 
for an end or purpose, convenient), and ta epitēdeia (τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, requisites, things necessary for living) 
[for the English renditions of the Greek terms I have consulted the respective lemmas, in: Henry 
George Liddel and Robert Scott (eds.), A Greek-English Lexicon, New York: Oxford University Press,
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general possess the capacity to become carpenters whether they put it into work or 
not. In contrast to the aptitude for making wooden artifacts, the actualization of the 
capacity to become a carpenter amounts to a change without any visible effect, un-
less a carpenter proves his or her skills in action; otherwise, carpenters look like all 
other human beings. On the level of natural reality, an inanimate being, a natural ele-
ment, say fire, has a capacity to perform an activity that extends its effects beyond the 
agent. Indeed, fire has the capacity to heat and burn any object brought into contact 
with it; a heated or burning body is an effect of the capacity of fire to heat and burn.
It may be observed that in both the above examples there is another aspect of 
aptitude that is to be located not in the agent itself but in the objects that are in-
volved in the performed action. That is, the wooden material on the one hand, and 
the medium that is the recipient of the action of fire on the other - for instance, the 
air that is heated by the fire, or a piece of wood burning in our fireplace. This illus-
tration shows that aptitude is a concept that ought be examined in a twofold man-
ner. In one of these the focus should be on the agent of a certain activity; in this case 
aptitude is regarded as a capacity connected with an active potency. But aptitude 
is also to be located in the matter in which the action is enacted, and in this case it 
should be considered as a capacity connected with a passive potency. This last case 
relates to a certain aspect of the context in which the notion of aptitude appears in 
the thought of Plotinus, who seems to regard epitēdeiotes as an alternative word for 
passive potency (δύναμις παθητική) or, one may say, a type of passive potency.
This sketchy description of aptitude may generate a fundamental question to 
the reader. One may wonder, what is that content of epitēdeiotes that comes ad ex-
tra to what is signified with the Aristotelian notion of potentiality (δυνάμει). In oth-
er words, what does the concept of aptitude bring about, other than what we get 
through the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality? Samuel 
Sambursky has made some useful relevant remarks. He notes that ‘potentiality is 
1961, 665-666]. The latter term epitēdeia produce the verb epitēdeuō (ἐπιτηδεύω, to pursue, to practice 
a thing), which, in turn, generates the nouns epitēdeusis (ἐπιτήδευσις, devotion, attention to a pursuit) 
and epitēdeuma (ἐπιτήδευμα, pursuit, business). One may easily notice that the last three terms are 
quite often in use both by Plato and Aristotle in political and moral contexts (see, for instance, Plato, 
Laws 778a7-8; 791d8-9; 968d1-3, Plato, Republic 374e4, and Aristotle, Athenians’ Republic 42, 2:6-8; 
59, 2:4). The origin of all these terms is the compound word epitēdes (ἐπίτηδες, purposely) or epitades 
(ἐπίταδες), which, as Chantraine admits, has an obscure etymological origin. Chantraine renders epi-
tēdes (ἐπιτηδές) with ‘à dessein, à cette fin’. The English equivalents of these terms would be intention-
ally, on purpose, or even of a specific end, see, Chantraine, Dictionnaire Étymologique, 361. One may 
reasonably think that such a terminological frame argues not only for the relational mode, so to speak, 
of epitēdeiotes but also for a strong personal orientation of it and of terms kin to it. With ‘personal 
orientation’ I wish to stress that epitēdeiotes is primarily qualified, and obtains its completeness, on the 
grounds of presence of an agent. With ‘agent’ I denote that genre of beings that are able to act freely 
from determinism. This should need a detailed justification, but I shall not enter into it here.
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only a necessary condition for actuality but it need not be a sufficient one’.38 In exem-
plifying the case he raises the question whether every illiterate is potentially a man 
who can read and write, and he answers that, ‘such a person is so only if he possesses 
the faculty of learning the art of reading’. So for Sambursky epitēdeiotes is a technical 
term that signifies the sufficient condition for the actualization of certain potency. 
He notes that it came into use as a definite scientific concept in the second century 
A.D.39 When it comes to the Plotinian use of the term, he admits what is said later in 
this paper in connection with ‘differentiated participation’, namely that epitēdeiotes is 
introduced by Plotinus ‘in order to illustrate his doctrine of the different degrees of 
participation in the Intelligible in spite of its presence everywhere as a whole’.40
Plotinus’ concept of aptitude emerges from and expands on his cosmic visu-
alization. What is the position of epitēdeiotes in this vision? What is the intellectu-
al mission of the concept? Does the concept emerge exclusively in a specific aspect 
of Plotinian metaphysics, or does it pervade the whole of it? Should one consider 
Plotinus’ account of aptitude developing by means of usages of the term epitēdeiotes 
and its derivatives, or is there any wider group of terms and formulations that estab-
lish the concept as well? Could the notion of aptitude be associated with the emer-
gence of the Plotinian hierarchy, and, if so, how? Should, for instance, aptitude of 
beings be considered as a cause for, or an effect of, the hierarchical structure of the 
universe? Moreover, are there any reasons why Plotinus should be claimed as an in-
novator who renews the concept in addressing questions that have not been raised 
before? In what follows I attempt to address these questions. In doing so I discuss 
parameters central to Plotinus’ metaphysics and related to the concept of aptitude 
that I deem necessary in such an inquiry.
It is true that Plotinus employs the term epitēdeiotes within a context similar 
to what we find it later in the thought of Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. But 
the frequency with which the term occurs in the Enneads is rather low. Epitēdeiotes 
recurs 8 times in the noun form (ἐπιτηδειότης) in: Ennead II.4 (Περὶ ὕλης,),41 Enne-
ad II.6 (Περὶ οὐσίας ἢ ποιότητος),42 Ennead IV.4 (Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν δεύτερον),43 Enne-
ad VI.4 (Περὶ τοῦ ὄν ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὄν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον πρῶτον),44 and in the very 
38 Samuel Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962, 106.
39 Ibid.
40 Sambursky, Physical World, 107.
41 Plotinus, Enn. II.4.7, 3; II.4.11, 28: (On matter).
42 Plotinus, Enn. II.6.2, 29: (On Substance, or On Quality).
43 Plotinus, Enn. IV.4.23, 3: (On Difficulties about the Soul II).
44 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.11, 4; VI.4.15, 2; VI.4.15, 13: (On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, 
everywhere as a Whole I).
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extant Ennead VI.7 (Πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπέστη καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ).45 More-
over, it occurs 6 times in the adjectival form (ἐπιτήδειος), in: Ennead III.1 (Περὶ 
Εἱμαρμένης),46 Ennead III.2 (Περὶ προνοίας πρῶτον),47 Ennead IV.3 (Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν 
πρῶτον),48 Ennead IV.4,49 Ennead VI.4,50 and twice in the adverbial form (ἐπιτηδείως), 
in: Ennead II.5 (Περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ)51 and Ennead IV.3.52
Such a rare use may indeed prevent one from acknowledging the significance 
which the concept has in Plotinus’ participatory metaphysical account. Indeed, if 
one is to comprehend aptitude’s role and function in Plotinian thought, one might 
take into consideration a wider conceptual frame within which the term is recruit-
ed. For it is true that a thinker may often develop his accounts in ways that go far 
beyond the frames that are marked by specific terminological illustrations. In oth-
er words, it is likely that a whole account is present in a philosophical text or con-
text without a single instance of the relevant terms that serve as key elements of 
the corresponding conceptual construction.53 To put it simply, the concept of ap-
titude may well be present implicitly in texts and contexts, even if the term epi-
tēdeiotes is not in use. Plotinus employs a wide range of notions that point a) to 
the notion of epitēdeiotes, and b) to the reality of participation. Equivalent to epi-
tēdeiotes are the terms a) ability to receive, generally denoted by dechesthai duna-
ton (δέχεσθαι δυνατόν),54 and b) attainability, in different connotations: kathoson 
dunasthai (καθόσον δύνασθαι),55 hoson dunasthai (ὅσον δύνασθαι),56 and kathoson 
esti dunaton (καθόσον ἐστὶ δυνατόν).57 As synonymous58 with the concept of partic-
ipation the following concepts should be considered: a) approach (προσέρχεσθαι) 
45 Plotinus, Enn. VI.7.7, 8: (How the Multitude of the Forms came into being, and on the Good).
46 Plotinus, Enn. III.1.1, 35: (On Destiny).
47 Plotinus, Enn. III.2.13, 10: (On Providence I).
48 Plotinus, Enn. IV.3.17, 5: (On Difficulties about the Soul I).
49 Plotinus, Enn. IV.4.23, 29 and 31.
50 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.15, 2.
51 Plotinus, Enn. II.5.2, 22: (On What exists potentially and what actually).
52 Plotinus, Enn. IV.3.8, 51.
53 Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, “Did St. Maximus the Confessor Have a Concept of Participa-
tion?”, Studia Patristica XXXVII, Papers Presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Pa-
tristic Studies held in Oxford 1999, Cappadocian Writers, Other Greek Writers, M.F. Wiles and E.J. 
Yarnold (eds.), Leuven: Peeters, 2001, 625. 
54 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.2, 49.
55 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.8, 40.
56 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.15, 6.
57 Plotinus, Enn. VI.5.3, 15-16.
58 The term synonymous (συνώνυμα) should not be taken here in the strict Aristotelian sense in 
which it appears in the Categories. Rather, I use it only in concordance with the second part of Aris-
totle’s definition, namely the very component of definition (ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας), which, 
in our case, is the concept of participation. See also, Aristotle, Cat. 1a6-8.
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and plēsiasmos (πλησιασμός),59 b) communion (κοινωνία),60 c) presence (παρεῖναι),61 
in the specific instantiation of omnipresence (πανταχοῦ εἶναι),62 and d) metalēpsis 
(μεταλαμβάνειν).63
Plotinus’ thought constitutes a transition-point in the use of epitēdeiotes. He 
is the first who elaborates the concept in a way that advances its use further, com-
pared to its initial role of designating the transition from potency to actuality and 
the capacity of matter for receiving the form, as initially conceived by Aristotle and 
analyzed further by Alexander of Aphrodisias.64 Plotinus is the one who, thanks to 
his detailed insights into the problem of participation, offers a significant contribu-
tion to the historical development of aptitude, so that he should be proclaimed an 
innovator in this respect. In fact, I do believe that Plotinus opens up a new horizon 
to aptitude, leading it beyond its natural context. In speaking of natural context I 
simply refer to the usage of the term by the Commentators of Aristotle, and espe-
cially Alexander, in an attempt to designate the inherent capacity, as Dodds asserts, 
of nature in the process of transition from potency (δυνάμει) to actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ).65 
But why should one assert that with Plotinus aptitude is upgraded and designates 
a component, and a particular expression, of the central doctrine of receptivity ac-
cording to the capacity of the recipient? What is this about?
Plotinus’ thought on the concept and the respective doctrine of receptiv-
ity proportional to the capacity of the recipient initially marked by Armstrong, 
evolves -as a large amount of secondary literature shows- in the central treatise on 
the omnipresence of being, Ennead VI.4-5.66 The classification of Plotinus’ works 
by his disciple Porphyry provided Ennead VI.4-5 with a title that denotes the com-
plexity of the question at issue: ‘On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Every-
where as a Whole’. The treatise is of particular interest. It deals with issues that shape 
the backbone of Plotinus’ metaphysical account, such as the nature of the Soul, the 
relationship of partial soul to the body, and the nature of participation. Here the 
59 Plotinus, Enn. VI.5.8, 20.
60 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.16, 14.
61 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.2, 39.
62 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.1, 13.
63 Plotinus, Enn. VI.4.8, 11.
64 Apart from Porphyry’s evidence in his Life of Plotinus about the circulation of the works of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias in Plotinus’ circle in Rome, there are additional reasons that prompt me to 
hold that Alexander was an inspiring thinker for Plotinus on the matter. I shall discuss them elsewhere.
65 Eric R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, 344.
66 The most recent study shedding light on this Ennead and, consequently, on aptitude is Ey-
jólfur Kjalar Emilsson and Steven Keith Strange (eds.), Plotinus. Ennead VI.4-5, On the Presence 
of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2015. For 
detailed bibliography on the topic and additional remarks, see Pavlos, Aptitude in the Areopagite. 
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concept emerges as a corollary from the treatise’s main issue, that is, the problem 
of the omnipresence of being everywhere, one and the same, as a whole.67 Plotinus 
uses epitēdeiotes to account for diversity in the bodily world, differentiation in the 
degrees of participation, and the ‘irresponsibility’ of the World Soul for the imper-
fections of bodily souls. The ideas discussed in Ennead VI.4-5 exercised a tremen-
dous influence on the development both of the reality of participation and the ap-
propriation of the concept of aptitude in Late Antiquity and later.68 It is most likely 
that it was the ideas of this treatise that Thomas Aquinas had in mind in reform-
ing the Neoplatonist view on matter’s non-existence and its identification with evil; 
namely that primary matter, although it may be called non-being on account of 
its privation, does share to certain extent in goodness by means of its aptitude for 
goodness.69 So this treatise is, indeed, a significant source in understanding the per-
plexities Plotinus faces in dealing with the problem of omnipresence.70
The question he is concerned with relates to an old and fascinating metaphys-
ical problem. In fact, it is about one of the fundamental issues deriving from Plato’s 
theory of Forms. Plotinus’ agenda comprises the problem of the relation between the 
sensible and the intelligible, and the omnipresence of being, which, as I have said, Pla-
to first discusses in the Parmenides.71 Nowadays it is called the ‘sailcloth enigma’.72 In 
its Platonic version the problem referred to as the ‘sailcloth’ enigma is the following. 
How particular beings, which – according to the basic idea of Plato’s theory of Forms 
– gain their being from the being, the universal and eternal idea of being, have a share 
of being? Do they partake of being as a whole? Or do they participate in a part of it?
Plotinus develops a certain strategy to solve the problem. He proceeds to elu-
cidate how the reality of participation should be conceived of. Participation emerg-
es within a certain metaphysical conception of the cosmos. As for any genuine Pla-
67 See, Jonathan Scott Lee, “The Doctrine of Reception according to the Capacity of the Recip-
ient in Ennead VI.4-5”, Dionysius 3, 1979, 79-97, Dominique O’Meara, “The Problem of Omni-
presence in Plotinus Ennead VI.4-5: A Reply”, Dionysius 4, 1980, 61-73, and Emilsson and Strange, 
Plotinus. Ennead VI.4-5.
68 Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution 
of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition, Leiden: Brill, 1978, 38 and 53.
69 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, pt. I, qu. 5, art. 3: ‘Although, according to the Platonists, 
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, 
it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz., by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness’. 
The translation is from the edition of Summa Theologica made by the Fathers of the English Domini-
can Province. For reading suggestions on the influence of the Plotinian doctrine in the Medieval phi-
losophy and up to Thomas Aquinas’ times, see Emilsson and Strange, Plotinus. Ennead VI.4-5, 28-29.
70 See also, O’ Meara, Problem of Omnipresence.
71 Plato, Parm. 130a-135c.
72 Plato, Parm. 131a4-6. See also, Steven Keith Strange, “Plotinus’ Account of Participation in 
Ennead VI.4-5”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 30:4, 1992, 479.
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tonist faithful to his master, the divine Plato,73 for Plotinus too, the starting point 
is the One, the Good. Plotinus anticipates a first principle of the cosmos. In En-
nead V.3 he develops an argument that reflects his hierarchical view of the world. 
His axiomatic start is that each multiplicity should be deriving from simplicity. As 
the world of sense is distinguished by multiplicity, the sensible cannot be made by 
an equally sensible principle but, rather, by something simpler. Anything simpler 
to sensible multiplicity pertains to the level of the intellect. But the intelligible is 
distinguished by multiplicity too. Therefore, the intelligible ought to be made by 
something even simpler to it. The intelligible multiplicity should be deriving by 
something that is not multiple whatsoever. The need for an ultimate principle leads 
to that which is ultimately unique, beyond any multiplicity and that is the One.74
This argument is the foundation of the methodology of inquiring into the 
One that is set forth in Ennead VI.5.75 Plotinus’ methodology stems from the fa-
mous juxtaposition between being and becoming, at the opening of Timaeus’ nar-
rative.76 In order for the inquiry to be fulfilled, Plotinus suggests that one should 
take principles proper to the intelligible and real substance. Admittedly, the dis-
tinction between what is in perpetual motion and what is always in the same con-
dition and remains within itself prompts one to search for respective principles that 
may be established by means of probable syllogisms.
Thus epitēdeiotes should be thought not in the realm of that being which re-
mains in itself, but rather in the world of movement and becoming. I am not re-
jecting yet, however, the possibility of identifying the presence of a certain aptitude 
connected with the One’s procession, on the condition that Its procession should 
be conceived of as belonging to a class equal to Its remaining; besides, for Plotinus 
both states are activities. I can understand that there may be objections to a propos-
al for locating any kind of aptitude in the One, but let us leave the question open 
for a while, and focus on the three-hypostatic structure of the all and the concept of 
double activity. For the Plotinian concept of aptitude develops on the basis of both 
these conceptions.
The theory of emanation, the cornerstone of Plotinian cosmology, presumes 
the overflow of the divine good substance – in other words, the internal activity of 
the One – as the external activity of the first hypostasis. This activity causes the con-
stitution of the other hypostases, namely Intellect and Soul. The relation between 
73 Plotinus, Enn. IV.8.1, 23-24: Λείπεται δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων (We are left with the godlike 
Plato). See also, Plotinus, Enn. III.5.1, 6.
74 Plotinus, Enn. V.3.16, 8-16.
75 Plotinus, Enn. VI.5.2, 7-18.
76 Plato, Tim. 28d-29a.
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the degrees of being, the ontological grades, has been an intriguing, and at the same 
time a substantial issue, because it addresses the inquiry into the ratio of affinity 
among the primary hypostases, namely the One, the Intellect and the Soul, as Ploti-
nus discusses it in Ennead V.1. What emanates from the One is nothing other than 
the very substance of It, the only difference being that the emanated is inferior to 
the One in terms of multiplicity and, therefore, otherness. So the Intellect, being 
something other than the One, is automatically a hypostasis inferior to It.
Plotinus distinguishes between two states of a hypostasis, starting from the 
One: rest (μονὴ)77 and procession (πρόοδος).78 Both are states of activity.79 A hyposta-
sis is introduced on the basis of an activity constitutive of the same and an activity 
constitutive of the other. That activity which is constitutive of the same constitutes 
the substance of the One. Hence, for Plotinus the substance and the activity of the 
One are identical. One may note, however, that this statement should be accompa-
nied by a clarification. When it comes to the first hypostasis, the One, which is con-
stitutive of the same activity, namely the internal activity of the One, is not identi-
cal with its substance in the same way in which this would be applicable to the other 
hypostases. For the One is beyond substance and, therefore, one should regard Its 
internal activity as an ambiguous issue, always subject to the qualification of the 
One as beyond being. Now the fact that the hypostases secondary to the One par-
take of It is because, being emanated from It, they are not self-sufficient. Their be-
ing cannot be taken for granted. They depend on the One and their dependence is 
precisely expressed in the concept of participation.
Participation
Participation involves two distinct parts; that which is participated and its partic-
ipant. The participated is in principle sufficient to itself, so that it does not partici-
pate in anything that participates in it. The primary participated is the One, which 
in the fullness of itself as It is, overflows, as Plotinus argues in Ennead V.2.80 This ef-
77 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.2, 26-27: πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνος· ἐκεῖνος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου· 
οὐκ ἐκεῖνος δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ μένων ἔδωκεν (they are he because they come from him; they are 
not he, because it is in abiding by himself that he gives them).
78 Plotinus, Enn. IV.8.6, 3-5: οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ πλῆθος ἦν ἂν τῶν ὄντων τούτων τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεννηθέντων 
μὴ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὰ τὴν πρόοδον λαβόντων (nor would there have been the multiplicity of these real be-
ings which are generated from the One, if the things after them had not taken their way out).
79 Interestingly, the Plotinian distinction between internal and external activity of the One is as-
sumed by the Areopagite, who rendered it in terms of the fundamental distinction between divine 
substance, which is imparticipable (ἀμεθεξία), and divine activity, which is participable (μεθεκτόν). See, 
Beate Regina Suchla (ed.), CD I, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, De Divinis Nominibus, PTS 33, Berlin: 
Walter De Gruyter, 1990, XI.6: 222.16, and J.P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 3, Paris, 1957, 956a.
80 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1, 5-10.
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flux is considered as a transmission of an activity different from the activity that 
constitutes the entity whence the activity proceeds. While the entity, the hyposta-
sis, remains in itself as internal activity, what overflows from it results in a certain 
otherness without diminishing the substance – which, in the case of the One is, in 
fact, a non-substance (ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ) – of the emanating entity. This ‘new’ en-
tity, which is inferior to the prior hypostasis, owes its being to the fact that it par-
ticipates in the prior. That is, it is a participant in the superior entity. Hence, what 
the participant substantially is, is a participation in what is overflowed, transmitted, 
as it were, by the participated. The status of being of such a participant should be 
regarded as a gift, in the sense that it has been granted by the initial source whence 
the activity proceeded. That means that the participant is only to the extent that it 
has a share in contemplation of the participated. To be precise, that which is about 
to become a participant becomes a substance upon halting and gazing towards the 
source from which it emanated:
‘τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς 
οὗτος. καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. ἐπεὶ 
οὖν ἔστη πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν᾽.81
I will not enter into examining the apparent difficulty the above scheme pres-
ents. That is, how exactly the external activity produces a hypostasis, and at which 
stage of the process the hypostasis inferior to its prior emerges. However, the case 
may be, what is rather clear is that this attitude, the halt and turning of the over-
flowed towards the One, is that which produces being. Consequently, the vision of 
the One by this being gives rise to a new hypostasis, in this case Intellect. I hope that 
this sketchy outline of how a hypostasis is produced may be helpful in understand-
ing what I said above, namely, that a participant is only to the extent it has a share 
of the participated on the grounds discussed earlier.
Having established that the participated is transmitted in terms of its external 
activity and constitutes the participant, the latter being a distinct entity only upon 
casting its gaze towards its source, one is prompted to think of reception by the par-
ticipant as being equal to such transmittance. But is it truly so? Plotinus sees that 
what the participated does is to transfer theoria, which is to be received by the partic-
ipant; the first procession, that of the Intellect from the One, involves a certain vi-
sion (ὅρασις, θέα, gaze). But it is not very likely that the participant will completely 
partake of what is transferred. For there are restrictions extending their effect to the 
81 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1, 10-13: ‘This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and 
is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One consti-
tutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One, that it may 
see, it becomes at once Intellect and being’.
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reception of what is transmitted. What do these restrictions amount to? Plotinus’ 
conviction is that they do not bind the participated at all. There are restrictions that 
occur exclusively in the participant. One way to conceive of these restrictions is in 
terms of difference. I would codify this idea with the term ‘differentiated participa-
tion’. Perhaps the best illustration of differentiated participation is to be found at the 
beginning of chapter 3 in Ennead IV.3, the first of two treatises Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν:
῾Τοῦ σώματος πεφωτισμένου τοῦ ἐμψύχου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο ἄλλως μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ 
μέρος· καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα, δύναμιν τὴν προσήκουσαν εἰς 
τὸ ἔργον ἀποδίδουσαν, οὕτω τοι λέγεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς δύναμιν τὴν ὁρατικὴν εἶναι, 
τὴν δ᾽ ἐν ὠσὶ τὴν ἀκουστικήν, καὶ γευστικὴν ἐν γλώσσῃ, ὄσφρησιν ἐν ρισί, τὴν δὲ ἁπτικὴν 
ἐν παντὶ παρεἶναι· πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι᾽.82
Plotinus locates in the human being a multitude of faculties. These faculties are 
active in accordance with the aptitude demonstrated in their respective instruments. 
At the same time, bodily being as a whole demonstrates an aptitude in instrumental-
ly serving the (bodily) soul. What does the holistic service of the body to the soul ac-
count for? One may assume that, for Plotinus, bodily functions ought as a whole to 
support the soul in maintaining her status of affinity with the divine in an unaffected 
state. At least this seems to be the idea behind the non-communion of the soul with 
the body. In Ennead IV.7, we see Plotinus’ principal concern regarding the affinity 
of the soul that is present in the human being with divinity. His concern is to mani-
fest the condition on which the human partial soul has an aptitude for participating 
in the unitary world Soul and through it in the One. The restrictions I mentioned 
above define the degree of reception of what is transmitted from the participated ac-
cording to what is called the receptive capacity of the participant, or aptitude.83
Why does Plotinus proclaim the integrity, so to speak, of the participated? 
My suggestion is that in developing such a doctrine Plotinus wants to prohibit one 
from charging the participated with any imperfect participation. In other words, 
what Plotinus is convinced about is that any deficiency or lack of perfection, or inca-
pacity for participation charges the participant, namely the receiver. Evidently, ap-
titude emerges in this context in connection to the two components of participa-
tion. Participation consists both in a transferring (μετάδοσις) of the participated and 
82 Plotinus, Enn. IV.3.23, 1-9; (On Difficulties about the soul I): ‘When the ensouled body is 
illuminated by soul, one part of it participates in one way and one in another; and according to the 
adaptation [aptitude] of (each) sense-organ to its task, as soul gives (each) the appropriate power for 
its task, so the power in the eyes is called that of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing, and the 
power of taste is said to be present in the tongue, that of smell in the nostrils, and that of touch in 
the whole body: for the whole body is sense-organ to the soul for this perception’.
83 See also, Arthur Hilary Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy 
of Plotinus, An Analytical and Historical Study, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940, 60. 
Christian insights into Plotinus’ Metaphysics and his Concept of Αptitude (Ἐπιτηδειότης) 21
in reception (μετάληψις) of it from the participant. This transferring is unbounded, 
perfect, unlimited and super-abundant, precisely as its source is; whereas reception 
may be limited, since it is dependent on the receptive ability of the participant.
Now, what is evident in the passage above from Ennead V.2. Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ 
τάξεως τῶν μετὰ τῶν πρώτων (On the Origin and Order of Beings which come after the 
First) is that the overflow itself should not be identified with a hypostasis. There 
seems clearly to exist a pre-hypostatic state, so to speak, which, although it may be 
acknowledged as otherness, yet it should not be identified with a distinct hyposta-
sis. For as Plotinus explains, the hypostasis is formed when this otherness, the prod-
uct of the overflow, ceases to proceed and for some reason feels the urge to turn 
back to its source. Here one encounters a tough question that Plotinus does not 
seem to answer in manner that is other than psychological. The question is, how 
and why the emanation generates entities inferior to the One and imperfect com-
pared to It, which – at the same time – desire to return to the One and seek perfec-
tion? I shall return to this point later on.
Consubstantiality
Plotinus admits that the account of the three primary hypostases is not his 
own invention but merely an explication of what Plato already knew:
‘Τοῦ αἰτίου δὲ νοῦ ὄντος πατέρα φησὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας. 
πολλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὴν ἰδέαν λέγει· ὥστε Πλάτωνα εἰδέναι ἐκ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ τὸν 
νοῦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ψυχήν’.84
In interpreting Plato, Plotinus establishes a hierarchy that consists of the 
Good (ἀγαθόν), the Intellect (νοῦς) and the Soul (ψυχή). In this hierarchy, nature, 
the sensible realm, is located within the third hypostasis, the World Soul, and more 
specifically, its gradations, the individual souls. One may note that the Soul – and, 
consequently, according to Plotinus’ argument in chapter 6 of Ennead VI.4, indi-
vidual souls too - is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the primary hypostasis, the 
One, the Good, God. Surprisingly, and in spite of what one would expect, Ploti-
nus does not frequently use the term homoousion. I say surprisingly, because, if one 
wishes to be consistent with the Plotinian conception of metaphysical hierarchy, 
one should take consubstantiality to be a necessary predicate for all beings deriving 
from the One. Indeed, there is a passage in Ennead IV.7 (Περὶ ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς), 
which, in my opinion, clearly supports my claim. Here Plotinus supplies us with the 
dual status of the soul:
84 Plotinus, Enn. V.1.8, 8-10; ‘And the father of Intellect which is the cause he calls the Good and 
that which is beyond Intellect and ‘beyond being’. And he also often calls Being and Intellect Idea: 
so Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and Soul from Intellect’.
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‘λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους καὶ θυμοὺς προσλαβοῦσαν καὶ πάθη 
ἄλλα ἀναδεξαμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῦτα ἀποτριψαμένην καὶ καθόσον οἷόν τε μὴ κοινωνοῦσαν τῷ 
σώματι. ἥτις καὶ δῆλον ποιεῖ, ὡς προσθῆκαι τὰ κακὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλοθεν, καθηραμένῃ δὲ αὐτῇ 
ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ἄριστα, φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, οἰκεῖα ὄντα. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν ἐφ᾽ 
ἑαυτὴν ἀνέλθῃ, πῶς οὐ τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης, οἵαν φαμὲν τὴν τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀιδίου παντὸς εἶναι; 
φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθὴς θεῖα ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἐγγένοιτο φαύλῳ τινὶ καὶ θνητῷ πράγματι, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη θεῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἅτε θείων μετὸν αὐτῷ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον᾽.85
There are two states of the soul. The first is that of the soul which ‘has acquired 
irrational desires and passions and admitted other affections’. The second is that of 
the soul ‘which has wiped these away and which, as far as possible, has no commu-
nion with the body’. That the above bring about alternative states of one and the 
same soul becomes evident if one pays attention to the referential ‘as far as possible’. 
This expression presumes an embodied soul, in which the alternatives occur as de-
pendent on the degree of the soul’s virtuous life. Virtuous life consists precisely in 
the ascending reversion of the soul towards herself (ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἄνοδος). The rever-
sive ascension of the soul is possible because of her affinity with the divine. The di-
vine origin of the soul is clearly stated as necessity and is posited by Plotinus along 
with the terms kinship (συγγένεια) and consubstantiality (ὁμοούσιον).
A kinship of the soul with the most divine and eternal nature is acknowledged. 
Divine reality has a genuinely good and prudent life. Similarly, given that the soul 
demonstrates an affinity with divine nature, it must itself have the same character-
istics. Moreover, this kinship should be regarded as a qualification of the soul, such 
that prohibits us from identifying a particular soul as body. For divinity pertains to 
the intelligible, which, in turn, is distinguished by no spatial or temporal divisibility. 
Divisibility, both in terms of space and time, is a property that occurs in the sensible. 
Besides, as Plotinus explains, prudence and virtue, being divine, could not abide 
in some trivial mortal being; rather such a being, viz. the soul, should be divine as 
well, since it partakes of divine things precisely on the grounds of its kinship and 
consubstantiality. This very passage, though unique in the entire body of the Enne-
ads, suffices to offer evidence for a fundamental qualification of beings within the 
Plotinian ontological hierarchy: since beings derive from the One as effects of the 
chain of consecutive external activities of the hypostases, they have to be consub-
85 Plotinus, Enn. IV.7.10, 1-20; (On the immortality of the soul): ‘Let us take soul, not the soul in 
body which has acquired irrational desires and passions and admitted other affection, but the soul 
which has wiped these away and which, as far as possible, has no communion with the body. This soul 
does make it clear that its evils are external accretions to the soul and come from elsewhere, but that 
when it is purified the best things are present in it, wisdom and all the rest of virtue, and are its own. 
If, then, the soul is something of this kind when it goes up again to itself, it must surely belong to 
that nature which we assert is that of all the divine and eternal. For wisdom and true virtue are divine 
things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but something of such a kind [as to possess 
them] must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality’.
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stantial with It. The alternative option that beings are not consubstantial with the 
One would be possible only within a non-emanationist account. Such an account, 
however, does not exist within Neoplatonism; it is only developed by the Chris-
tians on the basis of their distinction between created-uncreated (creationism).
Nevertheless, one should not neglect the value the term homoousion holds 
with respect to aptitude, that Plotinus employs herein. The soul herself has an affin-
ity with divinity. Her affinity stems from the fact that she has her substance in com-
mon with the divine substance. If this is so, then one would be correct in remarking 
that the entire Plotinian ontological hierarchy presupposes the principle of consub-
stantiality. In this view, the aptitude the soul demonstrates for return to herself is 
at the same time an aptitude for ascent towards the One. Hence consubstantiality 
should be acknowledged as a fundamental reality and condition in the Plotinian 
metaphysics. It enables Plotinus to speak of assimilation to God by means of what 
the soul demonstrates as aptitude for likeness (ἐπιτήδειον ὁμοιωθῆναι ἑκατέρῳ).86
Consubstantiality is that fundamental assumption upon which Plotinus’ sec-
ond and third hypostases emerge as consubstantial otherness to the One. This idea 
is profound in all successive Neoplatonist metaphysical accounts. Plotinian oth-
erness is established in terms of hypostases demonstrating a partial otherness, or 
more precisely, an incomplete identity of substance. I am using the expression ‘in-
complete identity of substance’ in order to stress that for Plotinus the degree of 
identity of substance is dependent on the grade of participation. This, in turn, is 
regulated by the receptive capacity, the aptitude for participation, of the recipient. 
It is in this respect that there seems to be a difference between the Plotinian sug-
gestion of consubstantiality and the corresponding Christian account of Dionysius 
the Areopagite. For Plotinus, assimilation to God is the starting-point and end of 
metaphysics. The whole setting of reality is primarily based upon the natural affin-
ity the soul has with the divine. That such an affinity is natural entails that it is also 
necessary. So for Plotinus, assimilation to God is a doctrine grounded on some-
thing that should be taken for granted: the divine origin of the soul and its conse-
quent ontological affinity with the divine. Dionysius, however, does not claim any 
consubstantiality of the soul with divinity. The Christian equivalent to the Neopla-
tonic likeness to God is not ascertained in terms of an initial, essential affinity be-
tween the human being, precisely the soul, and God. For Plotinus the soul has an 
essential aptitude for assimilation to God. But this does not seem to be the case for 
the Areopagite. For he would reject Plotinian consubstantiality and he would proj-
ect a process of deification, which mysteriously develops on the basis of an encoun-
ter among ontologically radically different personal hypostases.
86 Plotinus, Enn. IV.4.23, 29.
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There is, however, a problem here. For if Plotinus is correct in stating that the 
soul is consubstantial with divinity, then one must expect that all her aptitudes are 
present to her in imitation of the divine aptitude. But claiming aptitude for divin-
ity would circumvent the very essence of the Plotinian ontology of the One. For 
Plotinus the One is far from being in any state that involves potency, the latter be-
ing considered the ontological state within which aptitude evolves. I cannot pro-
vide an adequate solution to this problem herein. As far as I know, Plotinus does 
not offer an explicitly direct solution either. What I suspect is that he would prob-
ably agree with St. Maximus the Confessor in that it would not be proper to seek 
for aptitudes in divinity.87 Maximus’ position would probably be partly accepted by 
Plotinus, to the extent that both would deny complexity in divinity. I say partly, be-
cause for Maximus the denial to attribute complexity to divinity, by means of pos-
iting aptitude in her, is motivated by the contrast between the uncreated Trinitari-
an God and the creature within a genuinely creationist viewpoint.88 The distinction 
between created – uncreated, which Maximus acknowledges, is utterly incompati-
ble with the Plotinian emanative account of consubstantiality.
If that is the case, what then, is the source of epitēdeiotes in the Plotinian soul? 
Should it be inquired in its kinship and consubstantiality with the divine? If so, 
then one should look for aptitude as a divine property. Yet, again, such a viewpoint 
would be highly problematic. For the divine, insofar as regarded in the One, is sim-
ple activity. From this point of view, to seek for aptitude in a state of mere, pure ac-
tivity would make no sense. Ascribing a notion of aptitude to the One would pre-
suppose that there is something to be achieved; something towards which the One 
has to move, the notion of movement taken in a broad metaphorical sense here. But 
there is nothing standing out from the One, nor is there anything that needs to be 
accomplished by It. The fact that the One is perfect activity and perfectly self-suf-
ficient is by definition against any notion of aptitude present in It. If aptitude des-
ignates a capacity of a being for the reception or the accomplishment of something 
extraneous to It, then this cannot be the case with the One. Its uniqueness and per-
fection allows no room for us to imagine how there can be anything extraneous to 
it, at all. Now, if all that is divine is identical with the One in terms of self-sufficien-
cy, then, everything that is divine should not demonstrate any aptitude for anything.
So far we got, so good. But, indeed, is it truly so? This analysis seems to have 
made clear that it would be rather against the ‘nature’ of the One to claim for any 
kind of aptitude in It. Let us have another round of approaching the issue. In Enne-
ad V.1, Plotinus wonders about the Intellect:
87 Maximus the Confessor, De Charitate IV.8; PG 90, Athens, 2009, 1049b, and George C. Ber-
thold (transl.), Maximus Confessor, Selected Writings, New York: Paulist Press, 1985, 76.
88 Ibid.
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‘Πῶς οὖν ὁρᾷ καὶ τίνα, καὶ πῶς ὅλως ὑπέστη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου γέγονεν, ἵνα καὶ ὁρᾷ; νῦν μὲν γὰρ 
τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει, ἐπιποθεῖ δὲ τὸ θρυλλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ 
τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς, πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου ὄντος, οἷον λέγομεν τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν 
ὁτιοῦν εἴτε πλῆθος εἴτε δυὰς εἴτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖνο ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, τοσοῦτον δὲ 
πλῆθος ἐξερρύη, ὃ ὁρᾶται μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀξιοῦμεν᾽.89
In asking this question, Plotinus does not leave any curious follower unsatis-
fied. For what he addresses here is the most burning issue that even a young schol-
ar, immediately after a first glimpse of Plotinus’ metaphysical hypostatic hierar-
chy, would wonder about. Why the One, being supreme in the greatest possible 
degree, blessed in Its self-sufficiency and perfection, without need, complete, be-
yond any ontological quest, generates multiplicity and does not remain in Itself ? 
Furthermore, how can the One do so and, yet, maintain all the aforementioned 
characteristics? What is illustrated here is the evident problem that any produc-
tive activity of the One would automatically force It to exit from Its immutable 
eternity. But there is no reason for the One to move out of Itself. Hence, one 
should exclude any conscious activity of emanation, and consequently, any kind 
of epitēdeiotes related to One’s will. Rist confirms my claim concerning non-con-
sciousness in the activity of the One, in asserting that ‘there is no conscious turn-
ing of the One to the Soul’.90 In other words, the self-sufficiency of the One would 
prohibit any aptitude for generating beings other than Itself – whether should we 
take the One as being or not.
Yet, the metaphor of overflow (ὑπερροή) still calls us to ponder on the ap-
titude of what is generated for becoming Intellect, upon seeing the One. To my 
knowledge, I do not think that Plotinus proceeds to solve this problem direct-
ly and in detail. But what I suspect, drawing upon his overall account of the gen-
eration of the primary hypostases, the One excluded, is that we may locate the 
emergence of certain aptitude at the ‘moment’ when the generated halts and gaz-
es back towards the One, and the Intellect, respectively. That would be, I believe, 
an aptitude for remaining (ἐπιτηδειότης πρὸς μονήν). Yet, the question persists. For, 
even if we assume that it is fine to acknowledge the One as accountable for the 
benefaction of this aptitude, how should such an aptitude be qualified? For, pri-
89 Plotinus, Enn. V.1.6, 1-8: ‘How then does it [intellection], and whom does it see? And how 
did it come into existence at all and arise from the One so as to be able to see? For the soul now 
knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the 
ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a mul-
tiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by 
itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which 
we think it right to refer back to the One’.
90 Rist, Plotinus, 212.
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or to the conversion and the gazing upon the One there is no being yet. An ini-
tial aptitude, what, for instance, Proclus would establish later as essential aptitude 
(οὐσιώδης ἐπιτηδειότης) cannot help us at all, since it presupposes the state of mere-
ly being which Plotinus does not seem to acknowledge at this stage.91 This is a per-
plexity I have not managed to solve. It has been very hard to find evidence in the 
literature on this particular point; It seems that several scholars take this infinites-
imal detail in the generation of the second hypostasis rather for granted; or they 
just feel satisfied with the limited explanatory capacity the form of metaphor pos-
sesses. Yet, I would suggest a compromise in a temporal solution. Namely, to assert 
in a manner of speaking that there is a perfect, infinite aptitude in the One, which 
transfers simultaneously, and again, in a manner of speaking, to the generated and 
precisely allows for it becoming Intellect. Similarly, I would think the case of the 
second procession, from the Intellect to the Soul. Moreover, I would assume that 
this would be about a kind of ‘mechanistic aptitude’, and I would collate it with the 
radiation of light from the sun. That would be something close to what Plotinus 
suggests later on in the same Ennead V.1:
‘πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον; περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, 
οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος᾽.92
Earlier, I addressed a difficulty that occurs once one wishes to comprehend 
how and why the emanation mechanism generates entities inferior to their prior 
hypostasis, starting from the One, and imperfected compared to It, while, at the 
same time, these entities have a desire to revert to the One and seek perfection. 
Plotinus persistently addresses the question in a slightly modified manner that re-
veals a particular consideration of epitēdeiotes both as capacity of the intellect for 
seeing and as prayer (εὔχεσθαι). It is true that elsewhere he has explained emana-
tion by means of the over-excess of perfection of the One.93 Yet, one could specu-
late and – on the basis that the current setting relates to the first procession that 
comes out of the One and results in the production of the Intellect – one could 
dare to say that, reasons for the halt of what overflows are either the attractive pow-
91 In Proposition 39, of his Elements of Theology, Proclus states that: ‘Πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἢ οὐσιωδῶς 
ἐπιστρέφει μόνον, ἢ ζωτικῶς, ἢ καὶ γνωστικῶς᾽ (All that exists reverts either in respect of its existence 
only, or in respect of its life, or by the way of knowledge also), and he explains, further on, that: ‘καὶ 
ἡ ὄρεξις οὖν τοῖς ᾽μέν ἐστι κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι μόνον, ἐπιτηδειότης οὖσα πρὸς τὴν μέθεξιν τῶν αἰτίων᾽ 
(Some things, accordingly, have appetition in respect of bare existence only, that is a fitness [apti-
tude] for the participation of their causes). See, Dodds, Proclus, 40-43.
92 Plotinus, Enn. V.1.6, 27-30: ‘How did it come to be then, and what are we to think of as 
surrounding the One in its repose? It must be a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like 
the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it 
remains unchanged’.
93 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1, 7-10.
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er of the One, or –in more psychological terms- the realization that nothing can 
stand self-sufficiently, except for what is the source of self-sufficiency. A third rea-
son, and a more logical one, would be that no multiplicity whatsoever can stand 
independently of the One, and this is precisely what Plotinus has in mind in mak-
ing room for a halt of what proceeds out of It. But Plotinus himself has a differ-
ent opinion. He does not immediately proceed to offer an easy positivist answer. 
His answer emerges in the context of the relation of a particular soul, the human 
soul, with the One and offers a very rich alternative with valuable implications for 
our understanding of his concept of epitēdeiotes. This Plotinian alternative involves 
prayer. In Ennead V.1 we read:
‘ὧδε οὖν λεγέσθω θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένοις οὐ λόγῳ γεγωνῷ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν 
ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, εὔχεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον᾽.94
Plotinus conceives of prayer in its highest form; praying in this context is not 
about a loud repetition of words addressing God, but rather corresponds to this 
meditation and reflection of the One by a soul that is not distracted by the mul-
tiplicity of things. Moreover, Plotinus’ notion of prayer in our passage reveals its 
function in shaping the presuppositions for encountering the divine. It is about 
the proper preparation that will allow for the soul to attain the mystic vision of the 
One. As such, prayer is the provider of aptitude for recognizing the omnipresence 
of the One that Plotinus tries to explain in Ennead VI.5. In fact, the performance 
of this mystical prayer reveals to man a reality he was previously not aware of: that 
the One is always turned towards us.
There is a very interesting parallel at this point in the way Plotinus and Greg-
ory of Nyssa approach prayer. One may say - apparently on the condition that 
many significant differences should be acknowledged, such as the fact that for 
Plotinus ‘there is no question of a conscious turning of the One to the soul’,95 that 
cannot be discussed here – that St. Gregory confirms in his own way what Ploti-
nus says above, in stating that ‘Χωρίζεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ μὴ συνάπτων ἑαυτὸν διὰ 
τῆς προσευχῆς τῷ Θεῷ᾽ (he who does not unite himself to God by means of prayer 
distances himself from Him).96
Rist beautifully interprets Plotinus’ reality of prayer in the following way: 
‘When a man prays ‘alone to the Alone’, he has come to recognize that the One is 
always present and that it is up to himself to look towards him if he wishes. The 
94 Plotinus, Enn. V.1.6, 9-12: ‘Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in 
spoken words, but stretching ourselves out with our soul into prayer to him, able in this way to pray 
alone to him alone’.
95 Ibid.
96 Gregory of Nyssa, De Oratione Dominica 1, PG 44: 1124a; Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, 
“Prayer”, in: L.Fr. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Gregory of Nyssa, 643.
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higher prayer, like the lower, is recognition by man of what the universe is like. The 
One is always turned towards us; in the highest act of prayer we turn again towards 
him’.97 This interpretation reveals the eschatological dimension of epitēdeiotes in a 
Plotinian context that anticipates the fulfillment of the expectation uttered in the 
opening of Ennead V.2:
‘Τὸ ἓν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνως πάντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἷον 
ἐνέδραμε· μᾶλλον δὲ οὔπω ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται’.98
This is perhaps one of the most genuinely and wonderfully Neoplatonically 
expressed eschatological anticipations, that points - as far as it is attainable to the 
human intellect - towards an open ontology, the fulfillment of which is expected in 
the eschata. Plotinian eschatology may be portrayed as that state in which all apti-
tudes for beings’ conversion to the One will be fully translated into perfect actuali-
ty, that actuality of the unity of the whole. Doubtless, and given certain fundamen-
tal modifications, the motif of the unification of the whole is somewhat common 
between Plotinus and the Christian fathers, ever since the early Church, which un-
til now unceasingly repeats the request that all become one (ἵνα ὦσιν ἕν).
Conclusions
Epitēdeiotes denotes a concept of aptitude that is central in Late Antique and 
Early Christian thought. The concept is explicitly or implicitly enhancing the con-
ceptual apparatus of the Neoplatonists in their enormous efforts a) to conceive of 
the production of the cosmos from a singular being and principle, b) to grasp how 
multiplicity shares in unity, c) to analyze the reality of participation in all its di-
mensionality, d) to specify the communion between the hierarchically differentiat-
ed strata of beings, and e) to solve the problem of the bondage of the soul with the 
body in order for the resort to the divine to become possible. At the same time, the 
concept is developed by the Church Fathers as a central component of the philo-
sophical articulation of Christian doctrine, which, among other things a) argues for 
the creation of the cosmos out of nothing, b) argues for the entrance of the maker 
of the cosmos into it, with the Incarnation of God in the person of Christ, c) inves-
tigates the new horizons such an act of incarnation unveils to the mankind, and d) 
argues for the possibility of deification as the ultimate actualization of the capacity 
of the human being to become God by grace.
97 Rist, Plotinus, 212.
98 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1, 1-3: ‘The One is all things and not a single one of them: (for) it is the 
principle of all things, not all things, but all things have that other kind of transcedent existence; 
for in a way they do occur in the One; Or rather they are not there yet, but they will be.’ It would 
be worth studying further the reception of this Plotinian passage by the Church fathers: I am very 
confident that they have regarded it with great empathy.
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In Plotinus’ original Neoplatonist account aptitude has a central role. It ar-
gues for the fact that the ontological diversity observed in the cosmos is not due to 
the imperfect presence of being. The World Soul is wholly present, without discrim-
ination and limitations in the whole of the particular souls. Plotinus asserts that it is 
not any deficiency of the third hypostasis that should be blamed for the ontological 
differentiation among beings. What accounts for difference in the sensible world is 
the differentiated degree of participation in the Soul. The difference, this diversity, 
emerges and is governed, so to speak, by the aptitude of particular beings for estab-
lishing a share in the -superior to them- source of being. The centrality of the con-
cept is evident by the fact that it pervades the whole of the Plotinian system while 
it is linked to a wider cluster of terms and concepts. No less, Plotinus seems to be an 
innovator in the use of the concept of aptitude within Neoplatonism.
I would like to add a final note. One of the contributions of this article was to 
underline the firm and close relation between Plotinus and Christianity. Much has 
been written on it and presumably much more is about to come. What would be 
particularly interesting to see in the future bibliography is scholarly contributions 
that would challenge the almost commonly established – in the study of the history 
of philosophy – ‘evolutionary’ arrow that directs from the Neoplatonist, vertically 
hierarchized, emanative three-hypostatic All to the Christian, horizontally consub-
stantial, Trinitarian personal God and His cosmic manifestation through His di-
vine providential, creative, sustaining and redemptive activity that produces being 
out of nothing and grants it the gift of deification. In other words, it will be very in-
teresting to see further evidence that would challenge the present direction of this 
arrow in the philosophy of Late Antiquity.99
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